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Article 6

AIRLINE MERGER POLICY AND ENTRY BARRIERS:
A LESSON EROM THE PAST

by
Matthew V. Scocozza
McNair Law Firm

INTRODUCTION
Many criticisms have been voiced about the U.S. Department of
Transportation's oversight of the airline merger authority under
Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act. The Department of Trans
portation inherited this function from the Civil Aeronautics Board on
the occasion of that agency's sunset on December 31,1984. On
January 1, 1989, Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act was sunset.
Airline mergers are now governed by the general antitrust laws of
the United States as administered by the U.S. Department of Justice.
This paper is designed to give an inside look at each of the
mergers approved during the DOT era as well as the basis upon
which the decisions were made. Since review of barriers to entry
was of critical importance in the DOT review process, a primary
focus of this paper will be on barriers to entry. Since this paper will
touch upon acquisitions as well as mergers, I will use the term
"merger" to refer to both types of transactions.
This document will respond to criticisms voiced in the past as
well as review the important market by market analyses undertaken
by staff and decisionmakers. All too often critics have been quick to
judge the DOT perion of merger review by the "numbers" of cases
approved, revised, or disapproved. Responsible reviews of the
decisions should be made after an analysis of the specific circum-
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stances surrounding each case. Only when there is a clear and
informed understanding of past merger decisions can there be a
sound basis for the continued development of airline merger policy.
This paper will also briefly address two other developments that
some may argue should play a greater role in entry barrier analysis in
the airline industry -- airline owned computer reservations systems
or "CRSs" and special arrangements, referred to as code-sharing
agreements, between large carriers and selected smaller feeder
carriers. These developments may also have relevance to the
discussion on exclusionary conduct which follows.

AIRLINE MERGER POLICY AND ENTRY BARRIERS
The CAB's and Department's review of airline mergers has been
governed by Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.1
Section 408 (b) establishes the standard for review that is to be
applied. Before deregulation, Section 408 (b) conferred on the CAB
broad discretion to approve or disapprove airline mergers under a
"public interest" test. Maintenance of competition was not always
the CAB's highest priority in applying this test When Congress
enacted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,2 it amended Section
408 to reflect its decision that the airline industry should be gov
erned by the forces of the marketplace, not by federal economic
regulations. Although Congress retained the public interest test, it
added a specific competitive test3 Section 408 required the Depart
ment to approve a merger 1) that will not result in a monopoly or
further an attempted monopoly and that will not likely lessen com
petition substantially in any region of the United States and 2) that is
not inconsistent with the public interest Section 408 requires the
Department to disapprove a merger that does not meet these
standards, unless DOT found that it met significant transportation
needs and conveniences of the public that cannot be met through
any reasonably available alternative transaction that would be
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materially less anti-competitive.4 Parties challenging a transaction
bore the burden of proving its anti-competitive effects.5
The competitive test of Section 408 was very similar to that of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. For the record, the CAB and DOT
have never approved an anti-competitive merger under the trans
portation needs and conveniences test. The Department, therefore,
applied standards established under Section 7 in their review of
airline mergers. Under Section 7, review of a merger must consist of
a "functional analysis" which includes a consideration of an indus
try's structure, history and future, according to the Brown Shoe and
General Dynamics decisions and their progeny.6
In reviewing mergers, the CAB and, DOT attempted to deter
mine whether the merger would provide carriers market power
enabling them to charge fares above, or reduce service below,
competitive levels. This is also the central inquiry in Clayton Act
cases in other industries. However, the method of analysis for other
industries frequently may differ from that employed for the airline
industry. Most Clayton Act cases involve industries where new entry
is unlikely. The courts therefore assume that a significant increase in
market shares or concentration statistics substantial lessening of
competition unless the proponents of a merger can show otherwise.
In contrast, both the CAB and the Department have found that high
concentration statistics are not themselves reliable indicators of
market power in the airline industry, especially concentration
statistics in individual city-pair markets. This position was based on
the belief that in the absence of constraints on entry, carriers can
enter individual city-pair markets relatively easily. Before deregula
tion proved to be one of the biggest constraints on entry. Once this
barrier was removed, the threat of potential entry could discipline
the service of carriers actually in a market. This belief in turn was
not based solely on theoretical musing, but on the CAB's real-world
observations in some of its earliest decisions such as the National
Acquisition and the Texas International-Continental Cases that
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“Airline markets are nearly always concentrated by traditional
antitrust standards, yet most are competitive in performance."7
Therefore, in the CAB merger cases cited (among others), and in
concentrated on the Department's own merger decisions, such as
the Southwest-Muse and Northwest-Republic cases, bother agencies
concentrated on determining whether any entry barriers that would
justify inferring a loss of competition from a substantial increase in
concentration existed in the specific markets at issue.8 And since the
agencies drew no presumptions from concentration statistics, they
looked to merger opponents to demonstrate the existence of entry
barriers or otherwise to show anti-competitive effects. The Depart
ment discussed this issue at some length in the Northwest-Republic
case.9
One of the most significant developments in airline operations
in a deregulated environment has been the establishment of huband-spoke route networks. In hub-and-spoke networks, airlines
serve many routes emanating from a common hub. By combining
local traffic flying between the hub and each spoke end-point with
traffic flying between different end-points, airlines lower their per
passenger costs of operating any specific flight segment. Hub and
spoke operations permit airlines to serve smaller local markets that
could not sustain service with local traffic alone. In addition, airlines
compete vigorously with each other for passengers moving between
the same pairs of spoke end-points by offering single-plane or
connecting service over alternate hubs. The growth of hub and
spoke operations have clearly benefited many airline customers.
However, it has also generated controversy in airline merger cases.
Since one of the CAB's earliest merger decisions under the
Deregulation Act, opponents, including the Justice Department in
some cases, have contended that the efficiencies of hubbing are so
substantial that control of feed or “hub dominance" is an entry
barrier in hub city-pair markets. The CAB never seriously doubted
that access to feed was a relative efficiency factor that could reduce
a hubbing carrier's per passenger costs. However, the CAB also
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found, based on the evidence before it, that other factors — such as
lower operating costs, strong local traffic demand, reliance on onestop or connecting service to compete with non-stop service, or feed
from their own hubs — would permit carriers to enter successfully
hub city-pair markets served by a carrier with hub dominance.
Therefore, the CAB consistently concluded that the benefits of feed
were not so large as to preclude the threat of competition from
disciplining a carrier with hub dominance. Again, the CAB's conclu
sion was based on hard evidence from the real world. In each case,
the Board had before it examples of carriers actually serving hub
city-pair markets that they should not have been serving if hub
dominance really were a barrier to entry. The National Acquisition
and Continental-Western merger cases are good examples.10
The hub dominance issue was hotly contested in DOT merger
cases as well, especially those involving combinations of carriers that
had hubbing operations in the same city, such as the NorthwestRepublic (Minneapolis/St. Paul and Detroit) and TWA-Ozark (St.
Louis) cases.11 The Justice Department opposed each of these
mergers. In approving them, the Department determined that the
record did not support the Justice Department's contention that
competitors could not use other advantages, such as those outlined
above, to match the benefits of hub - dominance and enter the hub
carrier's markets. Again, the Department had evidence of carriers
actually operating where they should not have been if hub domi
nance really impeded entry.12
Some observers have made much of the fact the Justice Depart
ment and Department of Transportation took such diametrically
opposed positions on these mergers. I think these observers have
read more into these differences then they fairly should. Out of
twenty-odd major merger decisions by the Department, the TWAOzark and Northwest-Republic transactions were the only two that
the Department approved when the Justice Department urged
outright disapproval.13 The Justice Department reached its position
in part because it relied on the traditional antitrust notion that
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increased concentration implies loss of competition and in part
because it believed that one-stop or connecting service was not
competitive with non-stop service. DOT did not find that the record
supported either contention. At the risk of oversimplifying, DOT
found its expertise in the airline industry, supported by the records
in the cases, to be a more reliable than the Justice Department's
general antitrust expertise.
The hub dominance issue arose again in the USAir-Piedmont
case, even though there were no overlapping hubs.14 The Justice
Department did not challenge the merger, but another carrier, the
America West Airlines did. The carrier submitted evidence on the
correlation of fare levels in individual city-pair markets to a dominant
carrier's share of enplanements at the end points of the city-pairs. It
claimed that this statistical analysis showed that hub dominance
provided market power to allow the dominant carrier to raise fares.
In addition, its experts claimed that various business practices that
arose in the deregulated environment -- such as frequent flyer
programs, CRSs, override commissions for travel agents and sophisti
cated discount fare capacity control programs -- might give such
large advantage to hubbing airline as to be barriers to entry in hub
city-pair markets. I believe that they may have been following a lead
suggested by Professor Mike Levine in his article in the Yale lournal
on Regulation.15
The Department carefully reviewed these contentions and the
record in the case. It found that the statistical analysis was flawed
and therefore could not be relied on to demonstrate that hub
dominance conferred market power. With respect to Professor
Levine's article, I think he has raised some interesting theoretical and
analytical questions which probably deserve consideration in the
review of any future airline mergers. However, the Department
makes its, merger decision based on the characteristics of the airlines
and the markets in the particular case before it. In the USAirPiedmont case, the Department found that any competitive advan
tages that the business practices gave to USAir or Piedmont were not
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so large as to make the practices entry barriers in the markets
affected by the USAir-Piedmont transaction. I don't think anyone
would seriously argue that the ability of a carrier like American to
offer frequent flyers free travel to numerous European and Carib
bean destinations also allows it to compete effectively against USAir's
frequent-flyer program, even in cities like Syracuse where USAir
enjoys a strong presence. Some of these business practices may even
facilitate entry or expansion.
Limitations on airport access are the other potential entry barrier
that the CAB and DOT have most frequently considered in merger
cases. These limitations may take two forms: (1) the lack of terminal
or other ground facilities to accommodate increased service; and (2)
regulatory ceilings on the number of flights permitted to operate at
an airport. Federal restrictions on the number of operations at four
airports ("slots") — Laguardia and John F. Kennedy International
airports in New York, Chicago O'Hare and Washington National —
are the most well known of the latter category, but some airports
have succeeded in imposing their own limits as well.
Limitations on terminal facilities have been most frequently cited
by merger opponents as entry barriers in cases where hub domi
nance was also a central issue, such as the Continental-Western,
Northwest-Republic, and TWA-Ozark cases. In each of these cases
opponents argued that a potential entrant needed the ability to es
tablish its own hub at the affected city in order to exercise effective
competitive discipline over the merging carrier's hub operation and
that there were insufficient ground facilities to permit a new hub.
Generally speaking, the agencies have agreed that the affected
airports did not have adequate facilities to permit immediate entry
on a hub scale. However, the agencies found that there were
adequate facilities to permit entry on a lesser scale. As the earlier
discussion of hub dominance suggests, the agencies also found the
threat of entry on less than a hub scale to be sufficient to provide
effective competitive discipline. Therefore, the agencies have not
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found limitations on airport ground facilities to be entry barriers.16 In
the TWA-Ozark case, one carrier, Southwest Airlines, did have
access to sufficient ground facilities to support a hubbing operation.
When the Department considered whether slots are an entry
barrier it usually focused on the New York and Washington slotcontrolled airports. Each of these airports serves a metropolitan area
that also receives substantial air service through at least one airport
that is not under slot restrictions. With one exception, the records
before the Department showed that services at the airports without
slot constraints were part of the same market as services at the slotconstrained airports. Therefore, existing or potential service at the
unrestricted airports provided competitive discipline for services at
the slot constrained airports. The Department accordingly found
that slots were not an entry barrier requiring disapproval of the
mergers. The USAir-Piedmont case is an example.
The exception which proves the rule, the Texas Air-Eastern case,
involved unique circumstances. The merger involved the combina
tion of the two competitors in the Northeast Corridor air shuttle
markets (Washington National-Laguardia and Laguardia-Boston).
The Department found that these markets were airport specific and
that a competitor would have to provide hourly service to compete
effectively in the markets. The Department found that in these
circumstances slots were an entry barrier and it refused to approve
the acquisition until the applicants gave up enough slots to Pan
American to mount a competitive shuttle operation.17 In this case,
the Department agreed with the Justice Department that there were
competitive problems that needed to be fixed before the transaction
could be approved.
Before turning away from mergers I would like to address two
points recently raised by critics of past merger policy. First, they
suggest that the relative stability in market shares of merging carriers
at their hubs indicates that their hub dominance has insulated them
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from competition. Second, they suggest that recent trends toward
fare increases may be manifestations of a loss of competition in the
industry. To infer a lessening of competition in the airline industry
from either phenomenon requires a leap of faith that isn't justified.
Concerning market shares, as even the Justice Department
acknowledges, immediate new entry is not required, and should not
be expected, in order to exert competitive discipline on incumbents
in an airline market. Three hubs affected by DOT approved mergers,
Minneapolis St. Paul, Detroit and St. Louis has each seen entry by
new carriers and expansion by incumbents other than the merging
carriers. As to fares, the downward movement in fares for much of
the last two years coincided with dramatic decreases in the price of
aviation fuel, which is the second largest component of airline
operating expenses. In recent months, aviation fuel prices have
stabilized or started to rise. In addition, many airlines have made
commitments for, or started to take delivery on, large orders for new
aircraft. These aircraft must be paid for. Thus, the recent upward
trend in fares reflect no more than a change in airline cost structures
Turning to CRSs, the affiliations of the five U.S. travel agent CRSs
with airlines has been a subject of controversy ever since the CAB
first examined the issue. In its CRS rulemaking,18 the CAB found that
CRS operators used their CRSs to increase their share of sales by
agents subscribing to their CRS services at the expense of their airline
competitors. This phenomenon is referred to as the generation of
incremental revenues. The CAB found that by generating incre
mental revenues, CRS operators could reduce their own unit costs of
providing airline service while raising the costs of their airline
competitors. The CAB also found that airline economics and
distribution practices required airlines to be listed in any CRS that
had gained significant penetration in the travel agent industry.
Therefore, the CAB found that CRSs were analogous to essential
facilities under the antitrust laws.
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Based on its findings, the CAB adopted regulations that reduced
CRS Operators' ability to generate incremental revenues with their
systems.19 The rules also required the operators to give access to
their CRSs to other airlines on non-discriminatory terms and at nondiscriminatory prices.20
The CRS rulemaking has proven to be far from the last word on
CRSs. A number of airlines have filed private antitrust actions against
the airline affiliates of the largest CRSs, American and United.21 A
key issue in those cases is whether CRSs should be classified as
essential facilities.
As I noted earlier, the opponent of the USAir-Piedmont merger
argued that CRSs might be an entry barrier. The Department
rejected this argument in part because neither USAir nor Piedmont
at that time owned a CRS. Since the Department's decision, USAir
has agreed to join a group of four foreign airlines to purchase a fiftypercent interest in United's CRS.22
The Department very recently issued its study of the CRS
industry. The Department's study is probably the most comprehen
sive -- it is certainly the longest -- since the CAB's rulemaking.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that the study itself can answer all
questions about the current effects of airline-CRS affiliation in entry
barrier analysis for airline mergers. Among other things, the study
suggests that CRSs continue to generate some incremental revenues
for their airline affiliates, but precise determination of the amounts
and causes of incremental revenues was not possible. CRSs also
earn substantial fee payments from airlines that are listed in their
displays. It would not, however, be fair to infer from these findings
alone that CRSs benefit their airline affiliates so much that competi
tive discipline in the airline industry has been materially eroded.
Even if CRSs do create some advantages for their airline affiliates,
they also provide other carriers with convenient, quick and reliable
access to the nationwide distribution network represented by travel
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agents. To the extent that CRS participation allows carriers to avoid
using other more costly distribution methods, CRSs may enhance
competition.23
Code-sharing agreements also have been the subject of much
discussion lately. Code-sharing agreements are arrangements in
which a commuter carrier's flights are listed in schedules and CRSs
under the airline designator code of a large jet operator. The large
airline usually enters into these agreements to provide additional
feed support from smaller communities to its hubs. In addition to
sharing codes, the commuter services will often be marketed under a
trade name closely aligned with the name of the jet carrier, for
example American Eagle or United Express. Connecting flights
between the parties to code-sharing agreements receive the same
priority as true single-carrier connections in CRS schedule displays.
In addition, the jet operators offer joint fare arrangements to their
code-sharing partners that are more favorable than those they offer
to other commuters.
Although they have been part of the industry since the 1960's
they had not generated much controversy until the 1980's when
they began to proliferate. You need only look at the comments on
code-sharing in two rulemaking dockets, CAB Dockets 42199 and
41686 to appreciate the intensity of this controversy.24 Independent
commuters have claimed that they cannot effectively compete
against code-sharing commuters because of the benefits of improved
CRS listings and the special joint fare arrangements. When the
Department completed its study of code-sharing in early 198625 the
evidence available to it did not support these contentions. The data
relied on at that time suggested that independent commuters
continued to play a substantial role in serving smaller communities
and that they were effectively competing head-to-head against code
sharing commuters in many markets. However, later data suggested
that the benefits of code-sharing may place independent commuters
at a disadvantage, and that independents are declining as a force in
the market.26
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Although code-sharing arrangements may increase the costs or
risks of entry by independent commuters, I believe it is fair to
consider them as much entry tools as entry barriers. Increasingly, jet
operators are including code-sharing arrangements as part of their
program for establishing new hubs. United arranged for initiation of
United Express service at American Eagle service when it opened its
Raleigh-Durham and Nashville hubs. The Department has found in
a number of merger decisions, including the Northwest-Republic
and Alaska Airlines- Horizon cases,27 that participation in a code
sharing arrangement may facilitate a commuter carrier's entry or
expansion into markets around a hub.

CONCLUSION
The sponsors have reminded me that the purpose of this
symposium is to suggest lessons that general antitrust practitioners
might draw from the experiences of deregulated industries. Let me
close by suggesting at least one lesson to be gleaned from both the
CAB's and Department's experiences with airline mergers. It is
critically important for the decision-maker passing judgement on a
merger to thoroughly understand the nature of the industry and
markets, and the characteristics of competition and the competitors,
and affected by a proposed merger before applying the competitive
standards of the Clayton Act. Presumptions or even conclusions that
have been drawn about the nature of competition for some indus
tries or markets may not be readily transferable to others. As
antitrust practitioners, you can best contribute to sound antitrust
policy by assuring that the decision-maker is presented with the
information that will permit the thorough understanding necessary
for well-reasoned and reasonable decisions.
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